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Chapter 10  
Reformasi, Environmental Security  
and Development in Indonesia
Budy P. Resosudarmo
For a natural resource rich country such as Indonesia, being able to properly 
manage its natural resources is crucial in eradicating extreme poverty and hunger 
and ensuring environmental security. The fall of President Soeharto in 1998 
provided the opportunity for Indonesia to rapidly move from an authoritarian 
society to a more democratic one (often referred to as reformasi), and to conduct 
a ‘big bang’ transformation from a highly centralized towards a much more 
decentralized system of government. It was suggested in the early process of these 
transformations that this would offer the prospect for Indonesia to better manage 
its natural resources, and achieve a long–term development path that embraced 
environmental security, equity and alleviated significant rural poverty. This chapter 
conducts an overview of whether these predictions have begun to materialize. The 
findings of this chapter suggest that these the radical changes have instead created 
an environment of political uncertainty, inconsistent laws and regulations, weak 
law enforcement, a weak governmental system and insecurity of land tenure, with 
the result that ‘the management of natural resources in the country may not have 
worsened, but neither has it improved’ (Resosudarmo 2005, 1) at least in the short 
and medium term.
The setting
Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world with approximately 17,000 
islands stretching along the equator for about 6,000 kilometres between the Indian 
and Pacific oceans, and linking the continents of Asia and Australia. The country 
covers approximately 7.9 million km2 (including the Exclusive Economic Zone 
area), of which only approximately 1.9 million km2 is land. The main islands are 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Papua, and Java. Indonesia shares the islands of 
Kalimantan with Malaysia, and Papua with Papua New Guinea (Resosudarmo, 
Subiman and Rahayu 2000). 
The country is diversified, both in terms of its population and its natural 
resources. In 2006, the population reached approximately 240 million, consisting 
of around 350 ethnic groups. Most of these have their own languages and customary 
(adat) laws, regulations and norms. The two largest ethnic groups are the Javanese 
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Development in an Insecure and Gendered World196
(45 per cent of the population) and the Sundanese (14 per cent). The population is 
growing at an annual rate of about 1.5 per cent. The majority of Indonesians – 61 
per cent – live in Java and Bali, which together have a land area comprising only 
around 7 per cent of Indonesia. Another 21 per cent live in Sumatra (27 per cent of 
Indonesia), while the remaining 18 per cent inhabit Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Nusa 
Tenggara, Maluku and Papua – comprising the greater part of Indonesia in terms 
of land area. The majority of the population is Muslim (88 per cent). Nevertheless, 
other religions and denominations are represented; Protestants comprise 5 per cent 
of the population, Catholics 3 per cent and Hindus 2 per cent. 
Indonesia has long been considered to have abundant natural resources, such 
as oil, gas and minerals as well as rich and very biodiversified forest and marine 
resources. For example, oil and gas are found in Aceh, Riau, South Sumatra and 
East Kalimantan. Mineral ores such as copper and gold are abundant in Papua, 
coal in most of Kalimantan and West Sumatra, tin on Bangka island, and nickel in 
South Sulawesi and North Maluku. Indonesia’s vast rainforests account for over 
50 per cent of the tropical forests in the Southeast Asian region and more than 
10 per cent of the world’s tropical forests (Barbier 1998). In terms of area, the 
country’s tropical forests are third only to those of Brazil and Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (Zaire). Extremely diverse flora and fauna with abundant nutrients 
and untapped medicinal potential are found within these forests. Indonesia also 
carries the world’s largest remaining mangrove forests and has the largest area of 
coral reefs of any country. Indonesia’s waters are among the most productive of all 
tropical seas. The Banda–Flores Sea lies at the heart of global marine biodiversity; 
nowhere else on earth is there a comparable diversity of marine resources (Dutton, 
Hidayat, Gunawan, Sondita, Steffen, Storey, Merrill and Sylvianita 2001; Dutton 
2005). 
Forest and marine resources have always been important for Indonesia. At 
least 20 million Indonesians depend on the forests for their livelihood (Sunderlin, 
Resosudarmo, Rianto and Angelsen 2000). Similarly, millions of Indonesians have 
been, and continue to be, dependent on marine resources. Fish stocks in Indonesian 
waters provide a source of income and livelihood for more than five million 
fishermen. Fish provides more than 60 per cent of the animal protein intake of the 
average Indonesian and is the only affordable source of protein for the majority 
of the population (Bailey 1988; Dutton 2005). Indonesian women, though mostly 
do not take part actively in the commercial extraction of natural resources (except 
fuel wood extraction), have been significantly active in the processing activities 
of natural resources, such as fish processing, plywood as well as pulp and paper 
industries. 
Ironically, despite these forest and marine territories being rich in resources, 
most people whose livelihood primarily depends on them are among the poorest. 
Table 10.1 shows estimated numbers of poor people by major island groups in 
2004. The majority of rural poor in Eastern Indonesia, Sulawesi and Kalimantan, 
as well as significant numbers of rural poor in Sumatra and Java–Bali, depend on 
forest, marine and mining resources for their livelihood.
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Reformasi, Environmental Security and Development in Indonesia 197
Indonesia’s natural resources have been exploited for many centuries, including 
prior to the colonial period. This exploitation intensified with colonialism, 
particularly in Java, but it became worse and involved the whole country after 
President Soeharto came to power in 1966–67. He was quick to realize the potential 
of the country’s abundant forests, oil, gas and minerals for development. Realizing 
that large scale resource extraction could be performed only with the involvement 
of foreign investments, Soeharto enacted three important laws in the first year of 
his presidency. Law 1/1967 on foreign investment provided clear procedures for 
foreign operations in Indonesia along with generous tax concessions for foreign 
companies; Law 5/1967 on forestry, placed all forests under the control of the 
state; and Law 11/1967 on mining, inferred that all lands within the Republic of 
Indonesia could be used for mining. These three laws made all of the country’s 
natural resources available for extraction by large scale operations with a foreign 
investment component (Resosudarmo and Kuncoro 2006; Gellert 2005).1 
1 The Basic Agrarian Law No. 5/1960 also worked toward Soeharto’s interests 
on large–scale natural resource exploitation. This law clearly defined that in cases of 
Table 10.1 Estimated numbers of total and poor population by major 
island group in Indonesia, 2004
Island groups
Urban Rural
Total Poor Total Poor
Sumatra
 
15.7* 2.2 30 5.7
14% 19%
Java–Bali
 
65.0 7.8 64.5 12.9
12% 20%
Kalimantan
 
3.8 0.3 7.7 1
8% 13%
Sulawesi
 
5.0 0.4 11.5 2.3
8% 20%
Eastern Indonesia 
 
6.7 0.8 9.4 2.9
 12%  31%
Indonesia
 
96.1 11.5 123.0 24.8
 12%  20%
Notes: * = Numbers shown are in millions.
In general poor people in this table are those who are living below Rp 150,000 (US$15) 
per month in urban areas and below Rp 125,000 (US$12.5) per month in rural areas. The 
percentage number shows the percentage of poor population from the total urban or rural 
population in the island group.
Source: Statistics Indonesia (2005).
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Within the first few years of Soeharto’s presidency several multinational companies 
started natural resource extraction throughout Indonesia. Their operations were 
protected by Soeharto’s regime, which was then virtually unchallenged politically. 
During the 1970s, several major foreign companies became involved in oil 
extraction, particularly in Aceh, Riau, South Sumatra and East Kalimantan. During 
this period, oil became Indonesia’s main export commodity and the country’s 
major source of government revenue. In the 1980s, the role of oil in the Indonesian 
economy declined, but remained important, while that of other natural resource 
products, such as liquefied natural gas, copper, gold and timber, increased. By the 
mid–1990s, Indonesia had become the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural 
gas (Barnes 1995) and hardwood plywood,2 the second largest producer of tin 
(after China), the third largest exporter of thermal coal (after Australia and South 
Africa) and the third largest exporter of copper (after the United States and Chile).3 
It also produced significant quantities of gold, nickel and other forest products. 
Natural resource revenues were the main engine of economic growth in Indonesia 
during the 1970s, and remain of critical importance to the Indonesian economy. During 
the 1990s, oil and gas still contributed approximately 30 per cent of the country’s 
total exports (Resosudarmo and Kuncoro 2006), minerals and related products 19 
per cent and forest products 10 per cent (Simangunsong 2004). However, since the 
1980s the non natural resource based sector, particularly the labour intensive, export 
oriented industry, has taken over as the main generator of economic growth. The 
overall performance of the Indonesian economy from the early 1970s to the mid 
1990s was remarkable. The economy grew at an annual rate of about 7 per cent, 
while the number of people living below the poverty line declined from around 40 
per cent in the early 1970s to below 15 per cent in the mid–1990s. 
The massive and widespread exploitation of natural resources created problems, 
particularly since the granting of rights to exploit natural resources was not 
based on considerations of resource sustainability. Neither did it convey fair and 
equitable benefits to the public. Extraction rights were mainly given to individuals 
or companies that were close to Soeharto and played a key role in strengthening 
his regime (Gellert 2005; Seda 2005) and mainly had the objective to generate 
cash incomes for the regime as soon as possible (Resosudarmo and Kuncoro 2006; 
Seda 2005). The two main problems of natural resource extractions were, first, a 
sharp acceleration in cases of environmental degradation and, second, the skewed 
distribution of benefits from natural resource extractions. For example, although 
local resources and local land were being exploited, local communities received 
little or no benefit from these activities (Resosudarmo, Subiman and Rahayu 2000; 
Resosudarmo and Subiman 2003; Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002; Azis and Salim 
2005; Dutton 2005). By the mid–1990s, the two major problems with regard to 
conflicts over land use between the state and local people, priority should be given to 
national interests. 
2 World Forest Institute available at <http://www.worldforestry.org/wfi/trade-5.htm>.
3 Global InfoMine available at <http://www.infomine.com/countries/indonesia.asp>.
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Reformasi, Environmental Security and Development in Indonesia 199
natural resource extraction had reached their peak among the general public. Many 
stakeholders believed that as long as Soeharto remained in power and as long as 
Indonesia was unable to move to a more democratic society, these problems of 
natural resource management would persist.
The 1997 East Asian economic crisis hit Indonesia devastatingly hard, 
causing severe disruption to the country’s economic activities, so that in 1998 the 
economic output had contracted by about minus 14 per cent and inflation reached 
approximately 57 per cent. The crisis also induced a volatile political situation, 
forcing Soeharto to step down from the presidency on May 1998 after 32 years 
in power. The fall of Soeharto provided impetus for the transformation from an 
authoritarian society to a more democratic one in Indonesia, and for the move from 
a highly centralized towards a much more decentralized system of government. 
These transformations were thought to offer the prospect that Indonesia would be 
better able to manage its natural resources, and achieve a long term development 
path including environmental security. Environmental security in this chapter 
is generally defined as a sustainable environmental condition maximizing the 
benefits, which are accessible, by members of the society in an equitable way (see 
also Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Crook and Manor 1998; Maxhood 1983; Smoke 
2001; Uphoff and Erman 1974). Improvement in managing Indonesia’s natural 
resources should alleviate poverty, since most people whose livelihood primarily 
depends on natural resources are among the poorest. This chapter considers 
whether or not such expectations have begun to materialize. 
Political and economic developmen
During his presidency, Soeharto dopted an authoritarian rule. He did not permit 
any individual or organizations, including the military, to challenge this. Besides 
his own party, Golkar, Soeharto only allowed the existence of two other parties, 
the Indonesian Islamic Party and the Indonesian Nationalist Party. He intervened 
to a great extent in their activities, even in the choice of the parties’ leadership. In 
the last four elections during Soeharto’s era, Golkar won more than 50 per cent of 
the seats in parliament.4
In 1999, a year after Soeharto stepped down, the parliament enacted two laws 
related to political parties and elections. The first was Law No. 2/1999, allowing the 
establishment of new political parties that had clearly defined rights to compete in 
elections. The second law was Law No. 3/1999, paving the way for a considerably 
more democratic election that was held in 1999. During this election the media, 
with much greater freedom than in Soeharto’s era, played an important role in 
reporting political debates. The establishment of a new democratic environment 
with freedom to speak and to choose had not only made the election successful, 
4 In the last election of Soeharto’s era, 1997, Golkar gained 73 per cent of the seats 
in parliament.
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Development in an Insecure and Gendered World200
but also made it very similar to election situations in developed countries. This 
process of moving from an authoritarian to a much more democratic political 
condition was called reformasi by Indonesians.
Two years later, Laws No. 31/2002 and 12/2003, respectively, amended Law 
No. 2/1999 and No. 3/1999, aiming to establish an even better democratic political 
system in the country. In 2004, Indonesia conducted its second democratic election. 
These elections were conducted remarkably smoothly, with relatively few cases 
of violence or electoral fraud. In the April 2004 general election, 11 of the 24 
participating parties succeeded in gaining seats in parliament for their candidates. 
Later in the same year, Indonesians elected their president and vice president 
directly for the first time. The two rounds of presidential elections held in July 
and September 2004 went extremely well, with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
and Yusuf Kalla being elected president and vice president. More importantly, a 
balance of political power was achieved between the president and parliament and 
among political parties. This balance had been lacking under Soeharto (Aspinall 
2005) and in this sense, reformasi has certainly induced a much better political 
environment compared to that during Soeharto’s era.
The euphoria of reformasi also inspired society to push parliament to enact 
various new laws. This situation benefited the majority of Indonesians, since there 
were laws established during Soeharto’s era, particularly relating to land and 
natural resource utilization that needed to be amended. However, in many cases the 
newly enacted laws conflicted with other laws and created various problems and 
ambiguities. Take, for example, the case of mining in protected forests. Until the 
enactment of the new forestry law, Law No. 41/1999, there was no law explicitly 
prohibiting open pit mining activities in protected forests. Implementation of this 
new law prohibited operations intended by 150 mineral and coalmining companies. 
The affected mining companies rgued that they should be allowed to continue 
their operations in the protected forests because they were granted their permits or 
contracts before the issuance of the new forestry law. Meanwhile Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and the Department of Forestry argued the need to maintain 
the quality of protected forest. Although finally President Megawati Soekarnoputri 
approved Perpu (government regulation in lieu of regulation) No. 1/2004, which 
exempts all mining permits or contracts granted before the issuance of Law 41/1999 
from the prohibition, the conflict has promoted an unstable business climate and 
created disincentives for future business investment.
Another major change occurred in the governmental system. During Soeharto’s 
era, the governmental system was very centralized. First, almost all decisions at 
the local level were decided or strongly influenced by the central government. 
Regional governments had little input about policies in their own regions. 
Secondly, most revenues from economic activities in the regions, particularly from 
natural resource extractive industries, were collected by the central government. 
Although the central government distributed some of these revenues to regional 
governments, resource rich regions, particularly, considered that they should 
obtain much more than the amount redistributed to them.
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Reformasi, Environmental Security and Development in Indonesia 201
After Soeharto stepped down, Indonesia rapidly moved towards a much more 
decentralized system of government. This was achieved through the enactment of 
Law 22/1999 on local government and Law 25/1999 on fiscal balancing between 
the central and regional governments. In 2001 authority for all but a few areas 
of governance was transferred from the central government to districts and 
municipalities, including authority for agriculture, industry, trade and investment, 
education, health and natural resource management (Alm, Aten and Bahl 2001). 
The main goal of the decentralization policy was to give the regions a greater 
say in the development and growth of their own localities, so that regions could 
grow according to their potencies and capacities and allow locals to enjoy much 
greater benefits from this economic growth. The new policy also sought to resolve 
the longstanding tensions between some regions and the central government over 
the unfair distribution of benefits from natural resource extraction, by giving 
resource rich regions a greater share of the revenue generated by their own natural 
resources. 
The implementation of the two decentralization laws provided local people 
and local governments with input in the development and management of natural 
resources within their areas. These also created an environment to enable the 
exposure of conflicts and mismanagement of natural resources through various 
media and debates within parliament. The decentralization laws ultimately 
established more equal natural resource revenue sharing arrangements between 
local and national governments as a way to ensure that local people could enjoy a 
higher portion of the benefits of natural resource extraction.
However, the implementation of these two decentralization laws also increased 
conflict among various levels of government, particularly in cases where related 
laws and regulations were unclear. These conflicts typically occurred over trans–
or near–boundary economic activities. In the spirit of resolving this problem, in 
2004, both decentralization laws were amended by Law No. 32/2004 on local 
government and No. 33/2004 on fiscal balancing between the central and regional 
governments.
Meanwhile by 2005, the Indonesian economy began to recover from the 1997 
crisis. Economic output grew at the annual rate of approximately 4.8 per cent, so 
that in 2004 the gross domestic product (GDP) returned to the pre–crisis level of 
1997, though the per capita income was still 4 per cent below that in 1997, as a 
result of the increasing population. The inflation rate decreased from about 15 per 
cent in early 2002 to below 5 per cent in February 2004. International reserves grew 
steadily, while fiscal policy was considered relatively prudent. This improvement in 
economic performance has not been without challenges, particularly since the level 
of investment did not bounce back to the pre–crisis rate. One of the main reasons 
for this low investment is that reformasi and decentralization also created a very 
uncertain business climate in the country (McLeod 2005). There are at least three 
major explanations for this uncertain business climate. First, as mentioned, various 
levels of government faced increasing conflict over authority to produce permits 
for doing business in a particular region. These conflicts also often involved local 
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people, particularly when the economic activities utilized local land areas. Business 
communities became confused over who they should approach for the appropriate 
permit to establish a new economic activity. Second, there was a strong temptation 
for local governments to create new local nuisance taxes to increase their own 
local revenues. The main reason for this tax creation was that local governments 
faced increasing expenditure responsibilities. Although local governments were 
happy with reformasi and decentralization, they were also overwhelmed when 
their responsibilities increased due to the transfer of several central government 
functions, such as payment of all civil servant salaries (including those of several 
thousand central government employees reassigned to regional level jobs), and 
providing full public services previously performed by the central government, 
such as primary and secondary education, health clinics, local and regional roads, 
water supply and sewerage systems. Third, there was a change in the nature of 
corruption within Indonesia. The era of centralized political systems had ended 
and was replaced by a system where power and authority were more diffused. The 
nature of centralized corruption had also gone, replaced by a more fragmented 
bribe collection system where ministerial and local government officials, military, 
police and legislative members, both at the national and local level, demanded 
bribes. While in other countries decentralization may have nothing to do with 
corrupt behaviour, in Indonesia, already burdened with a corruption problem from 
Soeharto’s era, decentralization further fragmented corruption (Resosudarmo and 
Kuncoro 2006; Kuncoro 2004).
Although the global economy may have positively affected Indonesia it has 
also created three major challenges. The first is the impact of the increasing and 
highly volatile world price of oil. To keep domestic prices of fuel stable and low, 
the government subsidized these prices. This policy puts severe pressure on the 
country’s fiscal position and reduces the incentive to improve efficiency in fuel 
use. If this policy is maintained, domestic demand for fuel will keep increasing 
rapidly, escalating Indonesia’s emissions of carbon dioxide (McKibbin 2005). The 
rapid increase in domestic demand for fuel also reduces Indonesia’s net gain from 
oil exports (Resosudarmo and Tanujaya 2002). The second challenge is the impact 
of China’s high growth and rapid expansion in world trade in the new millennium. 
While the rapid pace of development in China is threatening because China and 
Indonesia compete in the same export markets, it is also promising because China 
is also increasing its imports, providing an opportunity for Indonesia to export 
more of its products, particularly primary products, to China. Indonesia can 
therefore expect to experience negative terms of trade effect for manufacturing and 
positive terms of trade effect for primary sectors such as forest products, including 
logs, lumber and woodchips (Coxhead 2005). If Indonesia is not cautious, the 
increased pressure on its natural resources caused by demand from China will lead 
to unsustainable levels of extraction. 
The third global challenge to Indonesia is the world recession of 2009. Slowly 
but persistently, it is slowing Indonesian exports, that causes export oriented 
industries to lay–off a significant number of workers. Without strong government 
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social safety net programmes, the number of unemployed and poor people in the 
country is likely to significantly increase and drive those unemployed and the 
poor, particularly those in rural areas, into natural resource extraction activities 
such as cutting forests, mining and fishing; and so creating a higher pressure on 
the environment.
Natural resource management
Reformasi and the implementation of decentralization often emphasized the need 
for local initiatives in shaping the vision and future actions of local authorities. 
Such initiatives have indeed occurred. In relation to natural resource management, 
these initiatives have produced a diversity of procedures for exploiting local 
resources to increase revenues and for safeguarding valuable sources of revenue 
from exploitation by others. Most of these initiatives have been based on 
expectations to gain immediate local revenues, but a few, in the spirit of reformasi, 
truly mean to improve the management of natural resources. These initiatives have 
produced new challenges in the management of natural resources that have long 
been problematic.
Forestry
The major challenges in the forestry sector related to the reformasi movement 
and the implementation of decentralization are the allocation of forest extraction 
rights, redistribution of forest revenue from the centre to local governments, illegal 
logging, and deforestation.
The allocation of forest extr ction rights continued to be contentious with 
decentralization. With the spirit to empower local communities, in January 1999 
the government enacted a regulation (PP No. 6/1999) to allow districts to produce 
small scale logging permits (up to 100 hectares for a short duration, typically 
one year) and to grant these permits to local communities. District governments, 
particularly in Kalim ntan and Papua, realized this was an opportunity to raise 
local revenues and so swiftly produced many types of this license in their regions. 
Communities, but lacking capital, also reacted quickly by finding business partners 
to conduct the logging activities. All activities were typically conducted by the 
business partners, while the communities, since they usually are at a disadvantage 
during negotiation, received marginal fees from their partners. 
These small scale logging licenses created two main problems. First, these 
permits caused an increasing number of conflicts among communities, typically 
over local rights to the areas associated with the logging permits. Secondly, the 
regulations for these small scale logging permits did not contain any requirement 
for replanting or systematic felling. There was no incentive for loggers to follow 
any measures for sustainable forest management. After the government recognized 
the problems caused by these small scale licenses, it cancelled the authority of 
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district governments to produce these in June 2002 (PP No. 34/2002). Some 
districts quickly obeyed this new regulation, but in many cases it was not easy 
for the central government to enforce this (Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002; Fox, 
Adhuri and Resosudarmo 2005).
Several issues concerned the redistribution of forest revenue from the central 
to local governments. District governments complained to the central government 
that the timing of the redistribution of these revenues had been uncertain and the 
calculation to redistribute these revenues was not transparent. The latter problem 
usually arose because only the central government knew how much forest revenue 
had been collected, while some the rules for distribution were unclear. For example, 
the rules to distribute the reforestation fund stated it should go to ‘producing 
regions’. District governments interpreted ‘producing regions’ as producing 
districts, while the centre defined ‘producing regions’ as producing provinces. The 
unclear timing of distribution and the lack of transparent calculation of the amount 
distributed made it difficult for district governments to estimate their revenues, 
and ultimately to plan their spending. Further complications have occurred since 
many district governments have asked logging companies to directly pay their 
taxes to district governments (Fox, Adhuri and Resosudarmo 2005).
The combination of confusing laws and regulations with other dynamics at 
the local level, increased conflict among communities, between communities and 
the authorities, and among levels of authorities. This also decreased the power 
of the centre at the local level, which created an incentive to local communities 
to reclaim their lands previously taken by Soeharto’s government with unfair or 
no compensation. The magnitude of ‘illegal’ logging activities also increased.5 
Local communities and governments saw these activities as a way to increase 
their revenues, and became involved or even instigated these activities. Local 
government then taxed these activities, one of the mechanisms being the issuing 
of small scale logging permits, hence ‘legalizing’ the activities of these illegal 
loggers (Casson and Obidzinski 2002). 
Not only small scale loggers have conducted illegal logging, but also large 
logging companies have done so for many years, by logging outside their 
concession areas, cutting trees of less than the allowable diameter, and under 
reporting their production. There are an increasing number of cases where large 
logging companies have also bought the products of small scale illegal loggers 
as cheap inputs to their companies emerged after reformasi. Clearly many parties 
benefit in the short run from these illegal activities (Obidzinski 2005).
This illegal logging and the large amount of small scale logging activities, 
combined with continuing activities of the usual logging companies and land clearing 
for plantations, continuing occurrences of forest fires, as well as the increasing 
demand for forest products from China, have doubled the rate of forest clearing in 
Indonesia from approximately one million to two million hectares per year during 
5 The definition of illegal logging here is broad, basically contravening any forest 
regulations.
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the period of the reformasi and decentralization (Fox, Adhuri and Resosudarmo 
2005). From this perspective, the ongoing reformasi and decentralization era has 
not yet produced better management of Indonesia’s forests. 
Fisheries 
One institutional change after the reformasi in fisheries was the establishment of 
the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF). This accorded the issues 
of coastal and marine management a higher profile, symbolized an increased 
level of political recognition of the significance of the country’s seas,6 and created 
the opportunity to conduct an integrated approach in managing fishery–related 
marine issues for the first time in the country’s history (Dutton 2005). Since its 
establishment, the MMAF has been conducting a comprehensive review of fishery 
and coastal development policies and has been proposing various management 
reforms.
Marine captured fisheries in Indonesia can be divided into offshore and inshore 
fishing. Offshore fishing is conducted by large boats, over 30 Gross Tonnes (GT) 
and often foreign owned, operated beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast, 
between the islands and out to the 200 nautical mile limit of Indonesia’s EEZ. 
Meanwhile, inshore fishing is conducted by domestic subsistence and artisanal 
fishers using small boats and gears, up to 30 GT, operated up to 12 nautical miles 
from the coast. Under the decentralization policies, jurisdiction over inshore fishing 
is partly under district (kabupaten) governments, from shore to 4 nautical miles, 
and the rest on the hand of provincial government, from 4 up to 12 nautical miles. 
The central government retains jurisdiction over the offshore fishing. The size 
of vessels, the nationality, wealth and political influence of their owners differs 
between inshore and offshore fishers and presents different challenges to fisheries’ 
management (Fegan 2003; Fox, Adhuri and Resosudarmo 2005).
For offshore fishing, approximately more than 9,000 fish and shrimp trawlers 
operate in Indonesian wat rs, plus a large proportion of pelagic purse seine and 
pole and line vessels and their motherships and reefers (international frozen 
cargo carriers). The majority of these vessels are owned by companies in China, 
Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines and Japan (Fegan 2003). Most of 
these vessels conduct illegal fishing in Indonesian waters; fishing without proper 
licenses, under reporting, or using destructive fishing techniques. In 2003, the 
MMAF indicated that about 7,000 vessels or about 85 per cent of all modern vessels 
above 50 GT have been operating in Indonesia without proper licenses (Kompas, 
9 June 2003). A significant number of these vessels operate without any license, 
some use duplicate licenses for other vessels, some use expired licenses, some use 
invalid licenses and some operate outside the permitted zone. The majority of these 
are vessels reflagged as ‘Indonesian’ by registering them as owned in joint venture 
6 Fishery issues used to be the responsibility of the Directorate–General for Fisheries 
under the Ministry of Agriculture.
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or chartered, under the name of a local company that provides only the vessel 
and fishing licences and in some cases, port services. The Indonesian company 
receives a fee to arrange papers for the vessel and crew, arranges supplies of fuel 
at the domestic price that is much lower than the world price, supplies water and 
food and deals with officials. It has no ownership in the vessel, gear or catch and 
no share in the profit or loss. These foreign vessels underreport their catches by 
only reporting approximately 30 per cent (Fegan 2003).
After the decentralization period, many of these joint venture vessels asked 
regional governments for licenses. In many cases, to obtain licenses from regional 
governments, vessel owners lie by stating that the GT of their vessels is less than 
it actually is. After receiving these licenses, these vessels can operate anywhere 
they want, including outside the areas stated in the licenses. Meanwhile regional 
governments are often eager to produce these licenses in an effort to increase 
their local government revenues as well as their personal incomes. Regional 
governments do not have any incentive to keep these vessels operating only in their 
sea territories since the higher these vessels’ production, the higher the expected 
incomes for regional governments.
The MMAF estimated that the total loss of revenues to Indonesia from illegal 
fishing in 2003 was around US$2,136 million, or almost equal to the total export 
value of Indonesian fish products, comprising US$1,200 million in the value of fish 
captured from the Indonesia EEZ and exported,7 US$574 million in lost licensing 
fees, US$240 million in unwarranted fuel subsidy, and US$122 million in loss of 
royalty and other fees (Tempo Interaktif, 19 February 2003). Additionally, illegal 
ships employ foreign crew, which represent a lost employment opportunity valued 
at approximately $780 million (Media Indonesia, 29 April 2002). It is expected 
that the amount of illegal fishing will continue to increase, since conducting 
surveillance activities in Indonesia’s huge water territory is very expensive. There 
is a strong incentive for regional governments to produce licenses, although these 
are not always the proper nes and collusive behaviour from some authority 
officials is difficult to detect. Consequently, over–fishing occurs almost everywhere 
in Indonesian waters (MMAF 2001).
For inshore fishing, district governments have the right to produce licenses for 
boats between 5 to 10 GT, which are expected to operate within a 4 nautical mile 
limit. Provincial governments can offer fishing licences to boats between 10 to 
30 GT, that are expected to operate between 4 and 12 nautical miles. ‘Traditional 
fishing’ or boats using less than 5 GT have not been regulated. All coastal regions 
are therefore open to exploitation by this simple method. 
Meanwhile, after the reformasi and decentralization era, there has been a strong 
call for local community involvement in surveillance of local resources, including 
marine resources. The uncertainty of area restriction for the use of small fishing 
boats as well as local community involvement in surveillance created increasing 
7 Representing an estimated theft of 1 to 1.5 million tons per year (Jakarta Post, 15 
August 2002).
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conflict within local community fishing. A typical case would be where fishermen 
from one district are caught by local fishermen in another district for fishing in their 
waters. For example in 2000, around seven boats from Pati and Tegal in Central 
Java were burned by local Masalembo fishers in East Java. Fishers from Brebes and 
Tegal in Central Java took Maduranese fishers from East Java captive for fishing in 
their waters. In many cases, these conflicts induced violent confrontations. Some 
cases cannot easily be resolved but others can be solved by the establishment of 
local fishing agreements (Fox, Adhuri and Resosudarmo 2005).
Mining
The utilization of mining resources also involves similar issues of ambiguity 
over jurisdiction and levels of authority as were encountered in the forestry and 
marine sectors. Unclear guidance to calculate and distribute revenues from mining 
operations to regional and local governments is also the source of disputes among 
regional and local governments and the centre. The Ministry of Finance determines 
the allocation of funds to each province; each province then becomes the distributor 
to its regions. In this process, provinces usually claim not to have received their 
right share from the central government and regions within provinces often also 
claim that their appropriations were inappropriate. Furthermore, subdistricts and 
villages, the areas immediately affected by mining operations, are the least likely 
to receive a fair share from these mining operations (Fox, Adhuri and Resosudarmo 
2005). 
The uncertainty as to how much total revenue is generated by the centre, the 
unclear guidance as to the distribution of this revenue to local regions, and the 
excessively long chain of revenue distribution to local levels make it difficult for 
local people to receive benefits from mining operations. Therefore local frustrations 
often induce land disputes between local and mining companies, and destructive 
activities over mining operation (Fox, Adhuri and Resosudarmo 2005). 
During the Soeharto ra, mining activities were regulated by individual 
Contracts of Work directly between the central government and the companies, 
typically under close supervision by Soeharto and his regime. These arrangements 
never included explicit contractual benefits to local people. There were companies 
that offered some assistance to local people affected by their operations, but these 
were usually as goodwill rather than as part of their contracts. Mining operations 
also typically brought in better skilled workers from outside the regions. Local 
communities certainly had reasons for feeling ignored in mining activities. 
However, since Soeharto and his regime used the military to guard these mining 
operations, local people were afraid to demand any compensation.
In the reformasi era, high level coverage in the media of human rights violations 
by the military and their ruthless business activities weakened their position in the 
regions. This gave locals the opportunity to reclaim their lands that were utilized by 
mining companies and demand compensation, and for illegal miners, often directly 
or indirectly involving local people, to operate in the areas of mining companies. 
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Cases of land disputes between local people and large mining companies as well 
as the amount of illegal mining increased significantly in the few years just after 
the fall of Soeharto (Erman 2005).
The implementation of decentralization laws, as mentioned, provided strong 
incentive for regions to raise their own revenues. In regions where mining 
operations were dominant, regional (district and provincial) governments quickly 
issued a variety of taxes and levies on mining companies. In several cases, regional 
governments tried to obtain revenues from illegal mining activities, such as in the 
case of developing and coordinating a village cooperation unit for illegal miners 
in West Sumatra, making these activities ‘legal’ (Erman 2005).
These taxes and levies imposed by regional governments, in addition to those 
specified in individual Contracts of Work; the activities of illegal mining as well as 
land disputes, have been regarded by mining companies as an increasing cost and 
arbitrary burden. Mining companies have responded to this situation by suggesting 
two possible options: either that regional governments become parties to the next 
generation of Contracts of Work or, that these remain as bilateral contracts between 
central government and companies but contain shares of taxes and royalties for 
regional governments.
Further complications occurred when a new Forestry law (Law No. 41/1999) 
was implemented. This law explicitly prohibited open–pit mining activities in 
protected forests for the first time. Approximately 150 mineral and coalmining 
companies were no longer able to carry out their operations.
In 2001, for the case of oil and gas, the central government enacted a new 
mining law (Law No. 22/2001) confirming the right of the central government to 
award mining contracts and to set the terms of these agreements, including the way 
in which profits, royalties and fees are determined and distributed. In 2004, the 
central government produced a government regulation in lieu of regulation (Perpu 
No. 1/2004), which exempted all mining permits or contracts granted before the 
issuance of Law 41/1999 from the prohibition. 
The conflicts, uncertainty and confusions have induced an unstable business 
climate in the mining sector and created disincentives for future mining 
investments. However, in the case of marine and forestry resources, exploitation 
appears to have increased after the reformasi and decentralization era, the reverse 
seems to be the case for the mining sector (Fox, Adhuri and Resosudarmo 2005). 
Hundreds of exploration projects in Indonesia have been suspended, withdrawn or 
remain currently inactive and investment in the mining sector has been very low 
up until now. 
Conclusion
Reformasi and the implementation of decentralization have provided the 
opportunities and challenges for Indonesia to respond to natural resource related 
utilization issues. Unfortunately, the transition period brought a situation of 
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conflicting laws and regulations, weak law enforcement, a weak governmental 
system, and insecurity of land tenure. This created several problems. First, instances 
of conflict among various levels of government have increased. Conflicts between 
central and regional governments particularly occur in cases where the centre 
wishes to assert its dominance. Conflicts among regional governments typically 
are jurisdictional disputes over natural resources that lie on provincial or district 
borders. Second, cases of disputes involving local communities over the right to 
exploit natural resources have also increased. These disputes tend to be between 
local communities and the state or a large natural resource company concerning a 
piece of land occupied by the state or the company but claimed by locals as theirs, 
based on their adat (customary) law, and among local communities themselves. 
Third, the nature of corruption has moved from a centralized type to a more 
fragmented bribe collection system, in which government officials, military, police 
and members of the legislatures, both in the centre and regions, are all demanding 
bribes. Fourth, the number of local nuisance taxes and natural resource extraction 
licences established by regional governments to increase their own revenues has 
increased. These local taxes and levies have increased the cost of doing business 
in the country, creating slow growth and low investment.
Despite these challenges, the ability of Indonesia to carry out such ambitious 
reformasi and decentralization programme within such a short period of time 
without incurring any significant social or political costs was an important 
achievement. In a short period of time, new laws and regulations related to natural 
resource management have been enacted, and though not perfect, they are an 
improvement over the old laws and regulations. Local communities as well as 
local and regional governments now have a greater say in the management of 
natural resources in their areas. Media and parliaments have the opportunity to 
conduct debates openly on conflicts and mismanagement of natural resources. A 
fairer system for the sharing of natural resource revenue between the central and 
local governments is now in place. 
There are also some signs that reformasi and decentralization policy will 
eventually lead to a better Indonesia. In 2004, as previously mentioned, to address 
some of the problems associated with the implementation of decentralization, the 
national parliament enacted two new decentralization laws, Law No. 32/2004 
on regional autonomy to replace Law No. 22/1999, and Law No. 33/2004 on 
regional financ  to replace Law No. 25/1999. If implemented properly, these 
new laws should soften the conflict between the central government and regional 
governments over authority for several key areas of responsibility (particularly 
those related to natural resources), result in a better distribution of the central to 
regional financial transfers and place some much needed controls on the number 
and type of local taxes.
An investment climate survey conducted by LPEM–UI (2005) indicates that, in 
time, the process of decentralization would itself contribute to an improvement in 
government performance and a reduction in corruption in the regions. The authors 
argue that as regional governments come to terms with their new responsibilities 
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under decentralization and are held directly accountable by their constituents, 
this would create an incentive for an improvement in regional government 
performance – one aspect of which is a reduced prevalence of corrupt behaviour. 
Local governments that appreciate the importance of attracting business and 
investment to their regions will also understand that business people and investors 
will be reluctant to commit themselves to regions in which the quality of public 
services is poor and corrupt officials are likely to impose heavy costs on their 
operations. Competition among Indonesia’s several hundred local governments to 
attract business and investment may well prove an effective means of improving 
the quality of public services and discouraging corrupt behaviour. In the end, better 
quality of public services and significant reduction of corrupt behaviour should 
significantly contribute to better management of natural resources in the country.
Finally, it may be concluded that, although reformasi and decentralization hold 
promises for better management of Indonesia’s natural resources, it will take a 
longer horizon for these promises to materialize. It remains to be seen whether 
or not Indonesia is able to secure its natural resources and environment for the 
benefits of the majority of Indonesian people. 
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